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T R A D I T I O N A L ideas of an exclusive, nearly hermetical state
sovereignty could never offer much more than a very rough, often thor-
oughly mystifying approach to the real world of politics. Historically,
one finds many examples of strong external as well as internal opposi-
tion against the concentration of political power within the institutional
framework of the nation-state. Still, nobody would doubt that the
consolidation of national forms of rule has been one of the most salient
features of modern European history (i).
Apparently, however, the picture has changed during the last decades.
The future of the European nation-state seems to have become more
uncertain than ever before. The autonomy of national political actors is
declining steadily in the areas of economic and social governance; at the
same time, European societies are becoming a more and more complex
patchwork of different—sometimes overlapping, sometimes colliding—
cultural identities. From the sociological and cultural point of view,
classical concepts such as the people, nationality or citizenship have to be
combined with new concepts and realities, e.g. integration, accultura-
tion, assimilation, syncretism, pluralism or multiculturalism. From the
point of view of law and politics, the traditional principle of sovereignty
has been detached from its original frame of reference. Is there a single
sovereign state in contemporary Europe which can convincingly claim to
exercise exclusive powers over its territory and its population?
Traditional state dominance in European transnational relations is
giving way to a more heterogeneous pattern of political interactions, a
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pattern displaying clear tendencies toward segmentation along function-
al, territorial and cultural lines. State diplomacy is supplemented by new
forms of 'paradiplomatic' activities, whose subjects are no longer
nation-states but supranational bodies, transnational corporations,
regions, border areas or cultural groups (2). At the same time, the
European dimension has become a very important factor especially in
the field of economic and social policies, even if these are still mainly
designed and implemented at the level of single states; here, the choice
of political alternatives in the national arena is clearly being more and
more heavily affected by the external imperatives set down, for instance,
in the Single European Act or in the Maastricht treaty. Can new forms of
cultural, social and political integration transcending the nation-state be
conceived against this background as a possible outcome of the institu-
tionalization of a European polity?
In his comparative political sociology of modern Europe, Stein
Rokkan (1975), attempting to offer a synthetic view of a complex and
differentiated set of historical tendencies, distinguished four sequences
in the political development through which nation-states in the Western
half of the continent came to be consolidated: 1) penetration of a terri-
tory by a political centre (state-building); 2) cultural standardization of
this territory (nation-building); 3) extension of citizens' rights to po-
litical participation (democratization); and 4) political redistribution of
economic resources (creation of welfare state systems). From the present
perspective, it seems quite evident that European integration will not
follow this traditional path of political unification, but we still lack the
conceptual tools needed in order to be able to determine the kind of
polity emerging at the transnational level of the European Union. For
the time being, the safest way of classifying the EU is to consider it to be
a novel form of political domination (Schmitter 1991), which combines
different spheres of governance with different logics of political
decision-making. Obviously, national policies are shaped by European
directives only in varying degrees. While some policy areas (e.g. agri-
culture) are highly sensitive to transnational norms, other areas (e.g.
foreign relations) seem to remain fairly unaffected by the guidelines stip-
ulated in the context of European governing bodies, such as the Com-
(2) Let me just mention an example of this tative chamber. This invitation by a semi-
kind of tendency picked arbitrarily from the sovereign political body immediately provoked
newspapers in February 1999: the Parliament the openly hostile reaction of the Spanish
of the Autonomous Community of the Basque government, which made clear it would try to
Country in Spain, which has a nationalist majo- obstruct the 'official' visit of the Kurds to ter-
rity, passed a resolution inviting the Kurd- ritory still located within Spanish state bor-
ish Assembly in exile to hold a session under the ders; see El Pats, 13 February 1999.
institutional auspices of the Basque represen-
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mission or the Council of Ministers. Nevertheless, the general trend
points to a successive Europeanization of an ever-growing number of
national policies.
This development raises a serious dilemma: to what extent can the
Europeanization of policies be maintained and justified without inten-
sifying corresponding developments in the domains of politics and of
the polity? The general dilemma underlies a series of important issues in
the current debate on the future of Europe, such as the democratic
deficit of the EU, the lack of a European public sphere, the shaky
foundations of a common European identity and, finally, the difficulties
facing any attempt to set up a comprehensive European frame for po-
litical communication not tied to national and linguistic frontiers, to
mention just a few topics my paper will touch upon. Put in a nutshell,
these issues are closely connected to one central problem: the advances
achieved in integrating sectoral policies and in extending fields of po-
litical regulation across European states are not matched by parallel
processes that ought to give the European Union a higher degree of
politico-cultural cohesion. Up to now, questions of 'cultural politics' (3)
have not been of much concern in the process of developing European
institutions. The political dynamics related to the articulation of cultural
identities, to collective struggles for official recognition and representa-
tion and to the interplay of sociocultural group differentiation with the
public definition of common civic bonds, have only received scant
attention.
What are the requisites and consequences of European polity-
building at the level of cultural politics? At first sight, it might be
tempting to look at previous experiences of political integration under
conditions of cultural pluralism in order to figure out possible futures
for the EU. In this respect, the crucial link between nation-states and
democracy in the Western world has certainly been established by the
status of citizenship, based on a common collective identity from which
a set of individual rights and obligations is derived. Thus it seems
unlikely that the convergence of the civil, political and social rights of
EU citizens can proceed steadily if there is no shared cultural space for
transnational public communication on the purposes and the direction
of such a process (4). In contrast with the precedent patterns of state
building, however, the present situation offers no reason to believe that
(3) I borrow this concept from Jordan and communication structures; the process of
Weedon(i995). creating such structures has been interpreted
(4) Modernization theorists have stressed as standardization (Rokkan), mobilization
that the integration of modern societies was (Deutsch) or functional homogenization (Gell-
contingent upon the development of operative ner).
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in the European context this common space could be the result of a
unilateral imposition by a dominant political centre; if at all, it will
develop as the outcome of a multilateral consensus, setting the founda-
tions of a political community that will not be homogeneous and prob-
ably not even united, but will rather remain a complex mosaic of differ-
ent cultural identities with cross-cutting political loyalties.
Language pluralism certainly constitutes one of the main configura-
tive elements of cultural heterogeneity in the EU. In this sense, it is
perhaps justifiable that this paper focuses on the role played by language
in the broader field of cultural diversity. There are good reasons to
believe that European polity-building cannot remain indefinitely dis-
connected from the establishment of a transnational public sphere,
which itself must lean on a generalized communication potential. On the
other hand, cultural standardization in the EU will not be realized by
putting major restrictions on multilingualism. How is this dilemma
tackled at the level of European institutions? Are there any signs indi-
cating a Europeanization of language policies that might reduce tradi-
tional homogenizing prerogatives of the idealized nation-state? In which
ways could the political regulation of language issues in the EU take up
the examples of other multilingual polities, and in which ways will it
require specific arrangements?
Before going into these problems, I will make a few remarks on the
relevance of the heterogeneous and multilingual shape of the EU in view
of the attempts at democratizing this new kind of polity. I continue with
a very brief look at previous experiences of language policies pursued by
West European nation-states. Then I turn to the thorny questions raised
by language pluralism in the present context of the EU. In the last sec-
tion of the paper, I will try to assess the consequences of the EU's
markedly heterogeneous profile for the project of building a political
community that is able to overcome the cultural rigidities typical of the
dominant nation-state model.
i. Democratic integration in a heterogeneous polity
In many respects, the present stage of European integration can be
characterized by the problems related to the 'democratic deficit' of an
emerging transnational polity. The impact of European decision-
making at the national, regional and local level of member states is get-
ting continuously stronger, but the institutional frame in which such
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decisions are taken lacks democratic legitimacy. The effects of European
policies become more and more patent all over the Union's territory,
whereas European politics still seem to take place in half-hidden arenas,
and the constitutional architecture of a European polity is difficult to
discern at all. The steady extension of the 'acquis communautaire' has
not been accompanied by comparable progress in the democratization of
European institutions. The difficulties associated with the project of
developing a democratic transnational polity have been the object of
many analyses in recent years (5). A recurrent motive of such analyses
has been to point at the weak cultural foundations of a European identity
which would give political cohesion to a transnational community of
citizens. Thus one is reminded of Jean Monnet's statement: 'if we had to
do it again, I would begin with culture' (6). Indeed, a position often
heard in the current debate on the future of Europe is that the pro-
nounced cultural heterogeneity within the EU inhibits the formation
and articulation of a common political identity among Europeans.
In the German context, Dieter Grimm, as an expert in constitutional
law and a member of Germany's Federal Constitutional Court, can be
considered a representative and prominent exponent of such a view. In a
noteworthy contribution to the discussion turning around the political
direction of the integration process after Maastricht, he takes the lack of
democratic legitimacy in the political construction of Europe as a point
of departure for an analysis aiming at the clarification of the options
available in order to find a way out of the EU's democratic impasse
(Grimm 1995). In this respect, he is not too optimistic. From his per-
spective, the prospects of establishing a foundational political consensus
in Europe that transcends the nation-state level are contingent upon
requisites beyond the reach of constitutional deliberations. According to
Grimm, plans elaborated with the intention of enhancing the demo-
cratic integration of the EU are bound to remain irrelevant, as long as
there are no real opportunities for cultural integration across national
borders. The constitutional lawyer is particularly skeptical about the
chances of establishing a European community of participation without
having previously created a European community of communication. In
order to stress this point, he uses a straightforward argumentation line:
there can be no European democracy because there is no European
public sphere; there can be no European public sphere because there is
no European people (in the sense of a demos possessing a collective
(5) For a compact overview of the debates (6) Cited in Berting(ioo7: 413).
on Europe's democratic deficit cf. Abromeit
1998.
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identity that would serve as a frame for political unity); and there can be
no European people because there is no common European language.
From this angle, language differentiation is seen as one of the major
features of cultural pluralism in Europe. The latter is considered to be a
factor obstructing the formation of intermediary political structures so
seriously that, at this moment, any attempt to delimit the proper insti-
tutional space for a truly European democracy seems doomed to failure.
Providing the idea of a European demos with concrete contents would
require a sociocultural underpinning not in sight at present.
Grimm's reasoning should not be hastily dismissed as an additional
manifestation of the long-lasting influence of ethnocultural traditions
on political thought in Germany. Leaning on such traditions would,
then, easily lead to an exaggeration of the problems that heterogeneity
implies for the establishment of democratic rule. But this is not the case.
The reflections just summarized remain firmly rooted in the broader
domain of modern democratic theory and rely on an assumption fre-
quently made, although not always in explicit terms, namely that the
cohesion of a political community based upon consent requires a certain
degree of homogeneity in the realms of language and culture. By restat-
ing this argument, Grimm does not pull out of the liberal-democratic
mainstream (7). Let us go back to the classics and have a brief look at one
of the seminal texts of modern liberal thought. In his Considerations on
Representative Government, John Stuart Mill (1958 [1861]: 230) writes:
Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities.
Among a people without fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak different
languages, the united public opinion, necessary to the working of representative
government, cannot exist. The influences which form opinions and decide political
acts are different in the different sections of the country.
In Mill 's opinion, the prospects of sustaining a democratic polity are
contingent upon the degree of national and linguistic unification pre-
viously attained within the territory of a given state. For the English
philosopher and politician, a collectively experienced 'fellow-feeling'
constitutes a substantial requisite for the successful development of
representative forms of rule. His view relies on the assumption that a
liberal democracy will only be able to cope with situations of intense
democratic conflict as long as its citizens have common ties in the basic
patterns of their identity, symbolized by language and culture. Being the
(7) That this mainstream has tended to lively debate in political theory during the last
confound cultural neutrality (or 'benign decade; cf. the pivotal contributions of
neglect') with the—at least implicit—support Kymlicka (1995) and Tully (1995) to a nor-
of a particular (majority) culture may well turn mative assessment of the consequences of
out to be one of the main conclusions of a cultural diversity for democratic politics.
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foundation of state unity, the nation becomes, at the same time, the
principal source of democratic legitimation. Thus a close connection is
established between state theory and democratic theory, as the scope of
processes of democratic deliberation and decision-making coincides
with the domain of rule by the nation-state. Indeed, the standard ver-
sion of state theories formulated in the European tradition postulates
that a state should have a uniform identity, a single source of sovereignty
and a unitary conception of citizens' rights and obligations, presuppos-
ing a society that is culturally homogeneous (Parekh 1997: 192).
Postulates of this kind have reappeared with force in recent debates
on the political dimensions of European integration. Those voices
advocating the virtues of a popular sovereignty that expresses the
essential features of a culturally based community, and that supports a
uniform set of public institutions, are overtly reluctant to exchange
the—apparently—safe enclosure of nation-state identities for the
uncertain construction of a supranational polity. Interestingly enough, a
frequent point of departure for analyses of the perspectives of European
polity-building that offer a thoroughly skeptical view of the EU's
democratic potentialities is an abstract, reifying and to a large extent
even idealizing model of the nation-state. With such an image in mind,
one can hardly avoid giving a categorical and one-sided account of the
effects cultural diversity or language pluralism has on the political scene.
Viewed in this light, there is a striking contradiction in Grimm's
argumentation: the historically and politically well-informed expert in
constitutional law denies that the experiences of multilingual European
states such as Belgium, Finland or Switzerland could contribute to an
adequate understanding of the situation in the EU, where the degree of
language differentiation obviously is substantially higher. The next step
in his reasoning is to affirm that a country like Switzerland had already
developed a national identity, which now serves as the frame for its
multilingual political discourse, long before constitutionalization
(Grimm 1995: 295-296). What remains unexplained and difficult to
understand, then, is how an encompassing collective identity could
emerge in the Swiss case, if the corresponding linguistic foundations
were lacking, as seems to be the case in present day Europe. Without any
doubt, Grimm raises important questions concerning the sociocultural
bases of the European integration process. Nevertheless, the tribute his
approach pays to the concept of the reified nation-state seems exces-
sively high. After all, the concept does not adjust in an adequate way
to the variety of forms of cultural integration in the nation-state
discernable across Europe: nation-states have not developed along the
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same lines all over the continent. The levels of national integration
achieved by state institutions vary profoundly from country to country.
In this sense, I prefer taking an alternative path when focusing on the
political consequences of cultural diversity and language pluralism.
In the rough sketch that follows, I will try to offer a simple heuristic
overview of the complex field of European language policies that
remains open for some significant variations on the empirical terrain.
2. Language policies in European nation-states
In the world of contemporary Western democracies, holding on to
the assumption that political integration requires a 'fellow-feeling'
grounded on common cultural identity would involve serious dilemmas.
After the transition to a liberal-democratic type of political regime,
homogeneity can hardly be enforced against the will of groups defined as
heterogeneous without violating fundamental rights. The 'solution' to
this problem offered by democratic theory has often simply consisted in
taking for granted that a minimum cultural homogeneity is 'already
there', having previously been created within the institutional context of
a nation-state. A normative discussion of the historical background of
national unification is generally avoided (Dahl 1989: 209). As far as the
problems of language diversity are of any concern from such a per-
spective, the process of 'language rationalization' (Laitin 1992: 9) in the
democratic nation-state is considered to be basically concluded. What
does language rationalization mean here? The concept refers to the
measures a political centre aiming at efficient forms of rule and admin-
istration has undertaken in order to impose the hegemony of a com-
mon language over the territory of the state. In this sense, language
rationalization proves to be an important element in the developments
underlying the formation of nation-states in Europe, in addition to the
processes of bureaucratic and economic rationalization extensively
analyzed by Max Weber.
The tendency to establish monolingual structures for communication
between public authorities and 'the people' actually seems to have pre-
dominated in the building of the larger European territorial and national
states. Nevertheless, there are remarkable differences from country to
country regarding the impact of these tendencies. France may be
considered to be the paradigmatic example of a state whose policies have
pushed for language standardization. As Eugen Weber has shown in his
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well-known study Peasants into Frenchmen (1976), from the second half
of the 19th century onward the French state made deliberate use of
compulsory schooling and conscription as institutional tools for dis-
seminating uniform cultural identity patterns within the population.
Political unity is not compatible with the plurality of languages and
cultures in the French republican state. As Jean-Marc Ferry (1994:
34-35) puts it sharply, in France the political category of 'integration'
has always worn a uniform (be it in the colour of military or in the colour
of school clothing, one may add). A close interlocking of republicanism
and the goal of maintaining a culturally uniform public sphere has
remained a dominant feature of French politics until today. France has
not signed the European charter on regional and minority languages so
far and is also the only EU member state referring explicitly to one
official language in its constitution, not mentioning the other languages
present on its territory (Birnbaum 1998: 355).
The historical experiences of France, as well as those of other larger
territorial states in Europe, however, can't be generalized without
reservations. It is misleading to suppose that there has been one standard
European model for the organization of rule by the nation-state
(Ebbinghaus and Kraus 1997: 339-344). The differences between single
paths of state formation become quite patent if one looks at the degree
of congruence in political and cultural integration patterns. It is true
that especially those European national polities succeeding the larger
absolutist states have made the attempt to combine the goals of territo-
rial integration and of cultural homogeneity when applying the princi-
ple of sovereignty within their domain of rule. Yet taking into account
its long-term results, the success story of the European nation-state
remains to a great extent a myth (Tilly 1992), even if in some cases the
attempts at homogenization were really far-reaching. A monopoly of
centralized state control in the realms of language and culture was
especially hard to establish in those countries having experienced only a
limited 'nationalization' of particular collective identities before enter-
ing the period of modern mass politics. In these cases, the institutional
negation of pluralism by the state would arouse the protest of already
mobilized ethno-linguistic groups (8).
European paths of state building have produced different levels of
cultural standardization and language rationalization. The political
guideline cuius regio, eius religio as well as its natural companion cuius
regio, eius lingua were not uncontested principles in the making of the
(8) As can be shown following Stein Rok- modern Europe; cf. Rokkan (1975), Rokkan
kan's account of nation-state formation in and Urwin (1983).
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European state system. Hence, there is a high degree of variation in the
interplay of language (or languages) and political public sphere (or
political public spheres) in West European nation-states. Focusing
exclusively on the member states of the EU, the range of constellations
to be found at present in the field of language policy stretches from state
monolingualism by and large corresponding to the sociolinguistic reality
of a country (Portugal) to the generalized bilingualism of public insti-
tutions (Finland).
Depending on the specific political context, the principle of territo-
riality and the principle of personality can be used as the elementary
instruments for the institutional regulation of language pluralism. At
the same time, language rights can be granted according to either rather
restrictive or rather generous criteria (9). To the extent that there is any
official recognition of linguistic heterogeneity, one obtains a simple
typology of the language policies implemented by European states by
combining the principle of recognition with the functional scope of the
recognition (see figure 1).
FIGURE I
The political recognition of multilingualism in West European states
#
principle of
recognition
#
functional
scope of recognition
#
partial
unrestricted
personal
I. provisions protecting
members of linguistic
minorities
IV. institutional
bilingualism
territorial
II. linguistic autonomy
III. linguistic federalism
(9) A detailed description of language policies in Western Europe is given by Siguan (1995:
59-90-
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Provisions protecting the members of language communities (I) are
an option chosen particularly in settings where the targeted groups have
become a minority even in their traditional core areas of settlement. An
example of this kind are the Sorbs in the German states of Saxony and
Brandenburg. This group of Slavic descent enjoys special cultural
rights; they are guaranteed by the corresponding state constitutions and
implemented on the local level, in the educative and administrative
realms, and can be conceived of as a partial and essentially symbolic
compensation for the strong pressures toward assimilating into the
German-speaking majority the Sorbian minority faces. Applied within a
limited portion of a state's territory, linguistic autonomy (II) ensures the
formal equality of minority and majority languages: both Catalan in
Catalonia and German in South Tyrol, for instance, share official status
together with the respective state languages, i.e. Spanish or Italian. The
official equality remains, however, exclusively restricted to the regional
context. In opposition to this, linguistic federalism (III) accepts and
recognizes several languages as state languages: this is the status Dutch,
French and German have in Belgium, or German, French, Italian and
Rhaeto-Romanic have in Switzerland. Still, as has to be kept in mind,
the consequent application of the principle of territoriality in cases like
these generally implies that the state is subdivided in political and
administrative units which, according to the officially adopted criteria,
are classified as largely homogeneous with regard to language (10).
Finally, institutional multilingualism (IV) does not restrict, in principle,
the official use of different languages by subjecting it to territorial
imperatives: thus in countries like Finland or Ireland, the public admin-
istration is committed to safeguarding the equal status of two state lan-
guages (Finnish and Swedish in the first, Irish and English in the second
case).
In order to figure out plausible political scenarios for the EU, it would
certainly be helpful to have the possibility of confronting more detailed
comparative evidence on the interrelations between public sphere and
democracy in strongly multilingual states. At first sight, one may at least
presume, it does not seem too probable that European democracies
paying an official tribute to multilingualism would suffer from a far-
reaching fragmentation of public discourses or would even have to live
with a permanent malfunctioning of their structures that should enable
(10) Brussels, having been defined as a consulted for a quick glance at the difficult
bilingual region within the Belgian state, is an coexistence of the language groups in Bel-
evident exception; Hartig(ia85: 73-74) as well gium's capital,
as Nelde and Weber (1995: 93-94) can be
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overarching processes of political communication. There can be no
doubt that language diversity, being an especially salient manifestation
of cultural heterogeneity, does alter the framework in which democratic
politics take place in a substantial way. But this does not mean that one
has to agree with the approach put forward by Mill or by Grimm and
regard a unitary culture grounded on language as an indispensable pillar
of a democratic political order. Of course, it would be pretty short-
sighted to ignore that linguistic and cultural diversity involves real
challenges for the institutional mechanics and the public's deliberative
capacities (i i) in all types of polity supposed to meet democratic stand-
ards. Such challenges, however, should not be automatically equated
with unsurmountable obstacles for building transnational democratic
structures in a heterogeneous Europe.
3. The language issue in the EU
At present, the EU has 15 member states. According to linguistic
criteria, more than 30 autochthonous languages are spoken in these
states (Haarmann 1993). The variation in the size of the respective lan-
guage communities is extraordinarily high: on the one hand, there is the
example of German, with its approximately 90 million native speakers
in the Union's territory; on the other hand, one comes upon small lan-
guage islands as those constituted by Sorbian (60,000 speakers) or by
Sami (about 20,000 speakers in Sweden and Finland; furthermore, there
are 25,000 indigenous speakers of this Finno-Ugric language in Norway,
outside the EU's actual territory). In the 15 states of the EU, 13 lan-
guages are state languages (German, French, English, Italian, Spanish,
Dutch, Portuguese, Greek, Swedish, Danish, Finnish, Irish and
Luxembourgian). In addition to them, we find 6 languages with official
status at the regional level (Catalan, Galician, Basque, Welsh, Frisian
and Sami) (12) ; several other minority languages get some kind of
official protection (e.g. Sorbian in Germany or Slovene and Croatian in
Austria).
(11) In his introduction to the new edition (12) The West European state languages
of his classical study, Habermas (1990: 33-44) simultaneously enjoying some official or
emphasizes the role of the public sphere as the semiofficial status outside their 'own' national
genuine'site'of processes of democratic delib- borders (as German in South Tyrol) are not
eration. included here.
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Hence, it is more than obvious that language diversity has to be
considered as one of the main characteristics of Europe's cultural pro-
file. This diversity would become even more salient after taking a glance
at the Eastern half of the subcontinent. The important point in the
context discussed here, however, is not language diversity as such. What
really matters are the political implications of the European Babel. They
result from the heavy historical weight of language nationalism in the
formation and consolidation processes of modern states on the continent
(Coulmas 1985: 41-58). Language is a highly significant issue in Euro-
pean politics. This observation applies not only to nations based upon
common ethnic or cultural ties, but also to state nations. In both cases,
the language factor played a very prominent role in the context of po-
litical integration. In cultural nations, the shared 'primordial' bond of
language has been used as one of the most elementary points of refer-
ence for the political definition of collective identities. In so-called state
nations, on the other hand, the political and administrative elites often
have deliberately strived for the linguistic standardization of the whole
public sphere. The effects of the two orientations have not been too
dissimilar in the area of language policies. It is probably no coincidence
that only three of the 15 EU member states—Great Britain, Austria and
Belgium—bear names which can't be automatically associated with a
(national) language.
How do the European institutions deal with the language question,
which must definitely be seen as a highly delicate one because of the
persistently strong links between linguistic and national identities? The
Treaty of Rome (1957) remained very careful when touching upon the
issue, only declaring in Article 217 that language matters concerning the
organs of the Community shall be resolved unanimously by the Council.
Article 1 of the corresponding Council Regulation determining the
languages to be used by the European Economic Community (EEC),
adopted in 1958, reads: 'The official languages and the working lan-
guages of the institutions of the Community shall be Dutch, French,
German and Italian' (13). The basic pattern of the institutional lan-
guage regime for an integrating Western Europe is outlined in this arti-
cle. Since the constitution of the EEC, an official commitment to a
multilingual consensus has served as the normative base for tackling the
question of language in the domain of Community organs. The addition
of state languages has been the prevailing guideline each time new
members were admitted. Dejure, the official language regime conceived
(13) As cited in Coulmas (1991a: 38); the additional articles of the Regulation can also be found
there.
150
POLITICAL UNITY AND LINGUISTIC DIVERSITY
for the European institutions does not draw a clear distinction between
official languages and working languages. Nonetheless, the internal
communication of the Commission and of the EU's administrative
bodies is governed by more 'pragmatic' de facto arrangements, that will
briefly be referred to further below in this article. In order to grasp the
'philosophy' underlying the development of European institutions in
matters of language policy, it is worth quoting Walter Hallstein, the
Commission's first President, who affirmed in 1974:
That the Europeans do not speak the same language cannot disturb us. Switzerland
provides the classical example of the fact that linguistic variety rather than being a
limitation is an enrichment, and we hope that our Belgian friends can soon be cited as
another example. Multiplicity of languages is no obstacle but an incentive. This is
demonstrated by our European officials in Brussels and in the joint research centres of
Euratom (14).
Up to now, the principle of equality of state languages has been
maintained by EU institutions without major revisions. Irish and
Luxembourgian have a special status as official, but not current working
languages. In a similar way, Catalan, as a regional, non-state language,
has obtained some recognition on a mainly symbolic level through a
Resolution voted by the European Parliament in 1990(15). Yet this
well-intentioned step with its rather limited impact does not imply a
deeper change of a situation that remains contradictory from a norma-
tive perspective: it is difficult to understand why, in the institutional
context of Europe, a regional language such as Catalan, with about 7
million speakers, should have a second class position in comparison to
state languages such as Danish (5 million) or Swedish (approx. 8 million
speakers) (16). After Sweden's and Finland's membership, the number
of fully official languages in the EU has increased from 9 to 11; at the
same time, the combinations to be covered by the translation and inter-
preting services have increased more dramatically from 72 to n o
(Siguan 1995: 167).
This pronounced multilingualism is precisely an element offering a
sharp point of contrast between the EU and international organizations
of a more traditional kind, guided by far less complex communicative
standards. The EFTA uses English as its only working language. The
Council of Europe has English and French as its official languages;
additionally, German and Italian are accepted as working languages. In
the UN, English, French, Spanish, Russian, Arabic and Chinese share
(14) Quoted in Coulmas (1991a: 28, note 1). (16) Figures given according to Haarmann
(15) Colomines (1992: 153-160) informs (1993:57,62,66).
about the political background conditions of
this measure.
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the status of official languages, the de facto working languages within the
organizational apparatus being English and French (17). It seems evi-
dent that the multilingual shape of the EU has a politically very im-
portant symbolic component: with its highly specific and ambitious
language regime, the Union emphasizes the political claim to be
substantially 'more' than just another international organization. The
system of integral multilingualism has been conceived in order to meet a
purpose that may even be considered to be 'democratic' by origin,
namely that the results of collective decision-making in the European
polity are accessible to all European citizens in a language they are
familiar with.
What are the administrative costs of the EU's official language
arrangements? One may be inclined to suspect that the 'linguistic
management' of European integration consumes vast amounts of
money. According to Coulmas (1991a: 23), about 40% of the adminis-
trative budget the Europe of the Twelve had at its disposal were directed
at financing institutional multilingualism. The proportions vary for the
different Community organs: for the Commission, 'language spending'
amounted to approximately 30% of the total administrative expendi-
tures, reaching a level of about 60% for the Council and for the Parlia-
ment. At first sight, these numbers look fairly high, but it has to be taken
into account that the total of sums which the EC spent in order to cover
its own administrative activities was relatively low. Consequently,
around 1990 the costs raised by multilingualism in the Community
organs did not add up to much more than 2% of the whole EC budget
(Coulmas 1991b: 30-31; Gerhards 1993: 103, note 19). For this reason, it
is not surprising that in 1982 the European Parliament could still pass a
resolution stressing that the equal treatment of all official languages
should remain an absolute priority over all kind of financial criteria.
Nevertheless, at present it may be much less easy to determine if such a
position can be maintained without major qualifications in the course of
the successive enlargements of the EC/EU.
So far, the language question in the European Union remains an open
one. While the general parameters of a European language policy have
remained diffuse, the procedures designed to regulate linguistic plural-
ism are not free of contradictions. This vagueness and inconsistency
matches well with the overall political form of the EU, difficult to grasp
in more than one respect. To begin with, there is a consequent com-
mitment to the cause of European multilingualism, which is seen as an
essential part of a common cultural legacy. Typically EU organs, such as
(17) I am drawing from the overviews in Coulmas (1991b: 25-26) and Siguan (1995: 169).
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the Commission or the Parliament, do not even restrict this commitment
to the domain of official state languages, but are apparently prepared to
extend it, albeit cautiously, to minority languages as well: the Commis-
sion has provided the European Bureau for Minority Languages, created
in Dublin 1982, with some material support (De Witte 1993: 169), while
the European Parliament has expressed concern for the protection of
cultural and linguistic minorities in several of its resolutions. At the
same time, however, it is beyond any doubt that the principle of 'integral
multilingualism' is basically a concession made to the tradition of the
national languages—in the narrow sense of nation-state languages—in
the project of uniting Europe. Therefore, it would not be plausible at all
to speak of a European language policy designed to undermine the
sovereignty of nation-states. Finally, the internal communication rou-
tines of Europe's political and administrative bodies do not allow for a
rigid application of the principle of official language equality. Thus it is
no secret that the Commission uses French and recently more and more
often also English as its de facto working languages (Calvet 1993: 189-
192). This does not mean, however, that there were explicit norms for
the de facto use of two—or occasionally three, if one wants to add
German, which has seen its position somewhat enhanced, since Austria
became an EU member—main languages in the administrative com-
munication within EU organs.
The principal obstacle in attempting to specify norms of this kind,
elaborated in order to pave the way for a transition from 'integral' to
limited multilingualism in the EU's institutional framework, is not dif-
ficult to discern: the consensus required to reach a general political
agreement upon a 'language rationalization' program for an 'ever closer
Union' of Europeans lacks political foundations. The open institution-
alization of language status inequalities, resulting from the systematic
promotion of one or two major transnational linguae francae at the
expense of the remaining European state languages, does not look like an
attractive proposal for debate in the EU at this moment. As a matter of
fact, recent European programs set up in the field of language policies,
such as LINGUA, have been intended to point in a rather different direc-
tion. They have given strong support to an extensive multilingualism
deliberately including the minor state languages.
Even if they are not native speakers, many members of the European
Parliament can probably be regarded as thoroughly fluent in the English
language. Yet, a significant number of them also continue to use the
interpreter services and put on their headphones when speeches in the
all-European Chamber are held in English. This, of course, is an arbi-
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trarily chosen example. Yet it may still help to illustrate the persistent
appeal of the idea of the national language in the context of European
integration. In general, one might add, the very terrain of political
discourse is especially prone to conflicts between the expressive and the
instrumental functions of language(s). On such a ground, affirming and
reproducing a particular collective identity may well turn out to be a goal
conducive to the narrowing of the channels supposed to be at disposal
for intercultural communication.
4. European futures: between a speechless public sphere
and a multiplicity of civic tongues
Europeans will continue speaking in different tongues. For the
foreseeable future, linguistic diversity should remain one of Europe's
most characteristic cultural features. The language patchwork might
even become more differentiated and diverse, as more and more lan-
guages of immigrant communities are joining the universe of the
autochthonous—be they national or regional—European languages. At
the present stage, it is an open question to what extent tendencies
towards linguistic assimilation will continue to predominate in the case
of migrant groups. In view of the apparently well-entrenched position
Turkish has in Germany or Arabic has in France, the trend may be that
new varieties of multilingualism emerge. Modern telecommunication
systems have enormously increased the possibilities for maintaining
group identities on a nonterritorial basis. As it develops into an infor-
mational society, Europe offers fertile soil for the organization of 'virtual
ethnic communities' (Elkins 1997). Although the Internet is certainly
contributing to a further strengthening of the global hegemony of
English, it also seems to be simultaneously enhancing the survival
capacity of smaller language groups who are able to expand their com-
municative networks well beyond their traditional range. In a similar
way, it seems highly plausible that the growing intensification of
interaction within collectivities dispersed across state borders and world
regions is giving a dynamic meaning to the figure of the 'long-distance
nationalist' (Anderson 1992: 12); just think of the recent mobilization of
the Tamils living in Australia or of the Kurds in Germany. Against this
kind of background, the differentiation of the European population
along linguistic and cultural lines is not likely to retrocede. From the
point of view of sociolinguistics, the arena of language policies in
Europe will probably become even more complex than it is at present.
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Without any doubt, during the last decades English has attained an
almost unchallenged position as the leading unofficial lingua franca in
Europe (18). Nonetheless, it should not be expected that the de facto
dominance of the English language between the Atlantic and the Urals
will soon get an official character by acknowledgement of the EU
member states. Any initiative pointing in this direction would meet with
all kinds of resistance. At the present stage, a political program aiming at
achieving linguistic standardization on a European scale is not an option
under serious discussion: in sharp contrast to the historical dynamics
underlying the formation of nation-states, there is no institutional centre
of power which could push for the realization of such a program. But
even if such a centre came into being—one may think of the Commis-
sion in Brussels having been assigned drastically enlarged compe-
tences—and started to propagate the linguistic unification of Europe,
the goal pursued would certainly remain out of actual institutional reach
in view of the expectable massive protest of political and cultural elites
as well as of large parts of the population, who would consider the
common European language to be an exoglossic standard.
However, the observation that standardization measures are impos-
sible to realize does not render the language question in the context of
European integration obsolete. The dilemma a uniting Europe has to
confront, as long as the current regulations concerning language are not
changed, is that, on the one hand, the elasticity of administrative mul-
tilingualism seems to have arrived at its limits; but, on the other hand,
feasible solutions in the sphere of a language policy for the EU are not in
sight. To what extent could this impasse play a role in the negotiations
on the Eastern enlargement of the Union? The states under scrutiny for
admission represent a sample in which the relatively small languages
predominate; giving these languages official status in the institutional
framework of the EU would imply a dramatic increase in the combina-
tions needing to be accounted for in operations of translating and
interpreting (19). Under normative aspects, there are hardly any
convincing arguments for relegating new members of the Union to a
second class status in the official European language system. The ques-
tion, then, seems to be whether the ongoing debates on the institutional
reform of the EU will be consequential in the sphere of language policy
too and will trigger off negotiations about a new type of language
(18) De Swaan (1993: 249-252) presents (19) If Poland, Hungary, the Czech Repub-
detailed figures showing that currently no lie, Slovenia and Estonia became EU mem-
other language can rival with the communica- bers, the number of official languages would
tion potential offered by English on the rise to 16; this would produce 240 language
Continent. pairs to be covered by the translation services.
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regime. Up to now, even the most hesitant attempts to restrain the
principle of equality for all official languages have not brought about
practical results. The truth is that any hypothetical proposal to modify
inherited rules, breaking with 'official officialism' in order to settle the
European language question proves to be highly controversial.
As already pointed out before, plans to concede a single state language
the privilege of becoming the institutionally sanctioned vehicle for
trans-European communication—English being the obvious first
candidate—are bound to fail due to their limited political persuasive-
ness. From the point of view of fairness, perhaps the most elegant
solution to Europe's communicative problems would consist in giving
support to a common language as neutral as possible. Several options
can be taken into consideration according to the criterium of impartial-
ity. One possible choice is Latin. As it functioned for centuries as a
European lingua franca par excellence, one may wish to reactivate its
traditional communicative mission. Indeed, this kind of approach was
adopted by the members of the European Parliament Patijn and Van der
Hek in a proposal addressed to the Commission in 1974. On a similar
line, Esperanto or other artificial languages could be regarded as poten-
tial tools for creating a shared space of communication in Europe (20).
Finally, there is the remote scenario of a political agreement in favour of
a small and genuinely marginal European language, that should not even
belong to one of the more important language families, as otherwise
maximal neutrality would not be guaranteed. Although suggestions of
this sort might in the end be less absurd than they appear at first sight, it
is pretty evident that their political relevance is at best a theoretical one.
There is still another possibility: reducing institutional multilingual-
ism to a manageable quantity of languages; let us assume that the cor-
responding outcome would lie somewhere between two and five. Taking
such a step, that obviously presupposes major political changes not only
at the symbolic level, implies a partial language rationalization fostering
'selective multilingualism' (Haarmann 1991). The potential bene-
ficiaries of such an arrangement would be, again and of course, English,
additionally French and German, perhaps also Spanish as well as Ital-
ian (21). Although having the character of a compromise, selective
multilingualism does not look like a recipe for avoiding political fric-
(20) Jukka Ukkola (1997) turns to this idea Linguaque—is constituted by elements taken
in an ironic short piece written for the Finnish proportionally from the different state lan-
vveekly magazine 'Suomen Kuvalehti'. He guages.
describes how the European Monetary Union (21) Possible selection criteria from the
is followed by the European Language Union. point of view of linguistics are discussed by
Its communicative medium—called Das Haarmann (1991) and Hagege (1992).
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tions. The main problem related to it is how to reach a consensus about
a reasonably low number of working languages. Drawing up a fair
selection procedure will hardly be possible without offering substantial
political compensations to those states not entitled to full linguistic
representation (22).
It should be stressed that the considerations sketched out in the last
paragraphs have only been devoted to the question of language use
within European institutions. Apparently, to set up rules restricting
institutional multilingualism in order to reach a higher degree of 'lan-
guage rationalization' in that specific context seems difficult enough.
Hence, it is difficult to conceive of the systematic transition to a lan-
guage regime capable of enhancing political communication processes
on a general all-European level without losing the support of a majority
of the Union's citizens. To what extent does this affect the prospects of a
public sphere based upon a cross-national communicative space emerg-
ing in Europe?
Replying directly to the pessimistic account Grimm gives regarding
the prepolitical foundations available for building a community of
European citizens, Habermas (1995) argues against the thesis that a
successful process of democratic integration requires relative cultural
homogeneity. According to him, the only bond which is ultimately
necessary for keeping a heterogeneous society together feeds upon
the values of a common political culture. Habermas does not really
pull out of the liberal-democratic mainstream, as he also maintains that
this bond is not just a ubiquitous phenomenon, but has to rely on a
functioning and broadly shared public sphere. Yet he denies that some
pre-existent cultural substratum is a necessary point of departure for the
formation of an integrated public. In the context of European unifica-
tion, this position comes to mean that the creation of a transnational
communicative space is a political aim which can be accomplished
through purely institutional efforts. The message emitted has an overt
voluntaristic undertone: the communicative space necessary for a
European democracy will come into being if the corresponding political
and constitutional steps are taken. The issue of linguistic communica-
tion is clearly not of central concern in the line of argument developed
by Habermas (1995: 307): the language problem is solved by stating
(22) The (extralinguistic) tensions under- tory meetings of the Council of Ministers, and
lying the dilemma described here have recently in the reactions of Spain and Italy to the
become quite manifest in the Finnish-German concessions the Finnish Presidency was pre-
dispute about the necessity of offering inter- pared to make in order to appease the Ger-
preting not only into English and French, but mans,
also into German at the informal (!) prepara-
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almost in passing that English is to become the 'second first language' of
Europeans.
My impression is that taking sides with the political voluntarism in
which the construction of a European communicative space becomes
essentially a matter of consequent institutional design possibly involves
one shortcoming: the partial and overdramatizing perspective of a
Euro-pessimism resting on culturalist arguments is exchanged for an
opposite view which is not unbiased either. From such an angle, the
formation of a European community of communication takes place in a
cultural context amazingly void of conflict. Yet sociolinguistic evidence
shows, by and large, that any multilingual social order denotes a conflict
potential between the communities speaking different languages. To
what extent this potential is articulated depends significantly on the
quality of the concrete political arrangements set up in order to deal with
multilingualism (23). Two aspects of the voluntaristic perspective seem
to be especially problematic. First, there is a consensual bias stressing
the imperatives of communication, that does not take into account the
strategic functions of language: as long as humanity remains multilin-
gual, languages will be two-sided tools. They can be used as instruments
both for 'inward' communicative integration and for 'outward' com-
municative closure. More than anything else, political factors do decide
which of the two sides is emphasized. Secondly, language is a frequent
and recurrent object of 'struggles for recognition' taken up by groups
defined by cultural criteria. Examples like Quebec, Catalonia, South
Tyrol, the Basque Country or the Brussels Region are showing this
again and again. Precisely because of the foreseeable obstructive effects
of a 'politics of recognition' (Taylor 1992) taking place on a generalized
scale, the possibility that the institutions of the EU could grant official
status to English as the single main language of a European polity is an
absolutely theoretical and remote one at the present stage. One does not
have to be an orthodox supporter of identity politics in order to concede
that any decision for one official language is always at the same time a
decision against other languages, relegated to a subordinate status.
Globalization speaks English, of course, but even so this language is not
automatically to be seen as a thoroughly 'neutral' medium for transna-
tional communication.
Apparently, the EU has to confront two double bind situations pro-
duced by the interplay of politics and culture in the field of its institu-
(23) See Weinstein (1990) for a broad range of case studies analyzing institutional responses to
societal multilingualism.
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tional development. Firstly, the growing dominance of English on
Europe's sociolinguistic map is steadily pulling down communicative
barriers among Europeans, at least at the level of economic, cultural and
political elites. Yet at the same time, this de facto trend will not be easily
translated into a de jure reality, as any attempt to concede English an
openly privileged official position in the all-European communication
network provokes decidedly negative responses by those EU members
fearing the political devaluation of their state languages. Hence, one
could argue that English is not only part of the solution to Europe's
language problem, but also part of the problem itself. The second
double bind is closely related to the first one. In the long run, a legitimate
and efficient European polity can hardly be conceived of without the
supports provided by an extensive public sphere. For this reason, setting
the foundations of a common public space should have a high priority
among European 'polity-builders'. On the other hand, creating these
political foundations will require a minimum cultural consensus—let us
use this concept in order to avoid speaking of homogeneity—that is not
within easy reach without a public sphere capable of formulating its
terms. Therefore, it is no major surprise that Europe's political elites
have made no manifest move toward inducing the formation of a (cul-
turally integrated) public sphere 'from above', as this implies opening
Pandora's box and might lead to such thoroughly counterproductive
outcomes as an anti-European mobilization of national actors (who will,
of course, articulate their claims using the argument of cultural differ-
entiation). Putting it even more bluntly: the political support needed for
erecting a European public sphere would only be disposable if there
were already some rudimentary structures of a broad and active Euro-
pean public.
The two double binds mentioned here are manifestations of a tension
that has probably been intrinsic to European integration from the very
beginning, even if it has remained latent for a long period: the goal of
market integration had to be carefully combined with the respect for
cultural difference, especially for the kind of difference embodied in
specific nation-state identities. The statement by Walter Hallstein, the
European Commission's first President, as quoted above, nicely cap-
tures the intention to show a 'multicultural' profile; Europe's official
language regime is its most obvious material expression. By now, there
is a well-paved institutional path protecting diversity in the EU.
It counterbalances the pressures towards cultural 'standardization'
that may be derived from political or economic 'imperatives'. Quite
obviously, the signposts on this path are multilingual.
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The purpose of these remarks is not to suggest that there can be no
political public sphere at all in the EU. After all, a pseudo-public
doomed to silence and political immaturity, as it lacks a common
language for deliberation, is not necessarily the only alternative to a
streamlined and culturally uniform all-European public space.
Nonetheless, it should have become clear that the issue of Europeani-
zation and language is delicate and highly complex. At the present stage,
trying to find a stable equilibrium between the goal of communicative
efficiency and the political recognition of cultural diversity looks like a
rather hopeless endeavour. One must not forget, however, that the EU
is known as a realm of protracted negotiations and sophisticated
compromises. From the corresponding point of view, a reasonable
way to approach the language issue might be to split up the problem.
Basically, this would imply looking for different answers to the question
of language, according to the different political and institutional levels to
which it is connected.
Here, an important distinction can be made between the internal and
the external communication of European institutions. As to the internal
dimension, the principle of multilingualism is anyway applied only to a
varying extent depending on the institutional locations and their com-
municative routines. Multilingualism is obviously much more pro-
nounced in the debates of the European Parliament than within the
Commission, where the language regime at work is already very selec-
tive. Regarding some of its practical aspects, 'official officialism' is more
a myth than a reality. In any case, the selection criteria used should
become more transparent and subject to an open discussion, if only for
reasons of political credibility.
Regulating the field of external communication, including the choice
of a language policy for a European public sphere, involves challenges of
another and perhaps more dramatic kind. The need for respecting
well-entrenched political identities that are deeply embedded in par-
ticular cultural and linguistic practices works strongly in favour of
linking the European polity to its citizens by the means of integral
multilingualism. Still, the ongoing debate on Europe's political future
should deliberately pick up the language issue and turn it into a matter
of public concern: European citizens have to begin thinking carefully
about the 'cultural price' they are willing to pay for being united. Again,
sensible approaches will try to avoid any 'all or nothing' constellation by
differentiating the problem. Reducing multilingualism in all-European
communication to a small number of languages might look less unac-
ceptable for many people if the matters addressed at that level remain
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restricted to a few political domains. In this sense, subsidiarity will cer-
tainly play a central role in the management of cultural conflicts in the
EU: all attempts at standardization realized at the expense of smaller
language communities should offer appropriate compensations to the
affected groups. The principle of subsidiarity could be given an addi-
tional dimension by subdividing Europe's political landscape into clus-
ters of countries, regions and groups sharing some cultural and lin-
guistic affinities. Within such clusters—let us speculate, for instance,
about the possibility of creating a 'Latin', a 'Nordic', a 'Teutonic' and an
'Atlantic' network in the present EU—communicative proximity facili-
tates the practice of passive bilingualism, A and B understanding each
other although talking in different languages. Finally, one should consid-
er that coming to terms with multilingualism might generate less ten-
sions if the objective is not to reach an agreement on a single common
language, but to define a small set of foreign languages to be covered by
European curricula and reflecting some convergence on the communi-
cative interests of Europeans (24).
In sum, the proposal advanced here is to replace 'official officialism'
by 'plural pluralism'. In a system of 'plural pluralism', cultural diversity
is institutionalized, but to varying degrees and with different implica-
tions at different political levels. In the contemporary world, the price
for ignoring the growing challenges of cultural pluralism is a loss of
political legitimacy. Projecting the functional imperatives of the reified
nation-state on Europe's institutional order leads easily in a wrong ana-
lytical direction. In a similar way, putting an a priori emphasis on the
negative effects heterogeneity has for the formation of a European
public sphere is a somewhat unconvincing approach to a highly complex
situation. The pluralist perspective tries to acknowledge the great
political relevance of culture. One of its main assumptions is that ethnic
and political cultures cannot be strictly and fundamentally separated
from each other in the institutional reality of modern societies (Bader
1997). Thus considering the project of Europeanization in the light of
cultural diversity leads to the very conclusion that even a politico-
institutional framework designed in order to meet the requirements
of culture-blindness will continue requiring linguistic mediation;
the choice of the adequate language can hardly be detached from a par-
ticular cultural heritage.
(24) Using the evidence provided by formal belonging to different first language commu-
models, Colomer(iaa6: 134-136) shows that in nities share a common second language
multilingual settings comparable to the present increases clearly with bilingualism and almost
EU, the probability that two individuals spectacularly with generalized trilingualism.
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While paying tribute to the political significance of cultural identities,
plural pluralism—called plural precisely because it abstains from prais-
ing pluralism as a uniform source for policy recommendations—does
not succumb to the temptation of essentializing them. It is directed at
breaking up the rigid connection between legitimate ('democratic')
forms of rule and the institutionalization of single and exclusive identity
patterns that has been typically realized by nation-states. If both the
empirical and the normative significance of the principle of national
sovereignty are being progressively questioned, there is no substantial
reason why the 'one' and homogeneous demos considered to be the
source of this sovereignty should not be disaggregated as well. The
logical next step would be to recompose or create multiple demoi cover-
ing different (functional and territorial) levels of political deliberation.
In this context, the speculations about a 'new medievalism' in European
politics might indeed carry some weight: single domains of decision-
making would be located in a contextually differentiated space not
necessarily subject to the control by a 'common will'; at the same time,
the central elements of political citizenship would acquire a general
transnational character. In the end, a European Union adopting this
approach might only need weak cultural foundations in order to con-
struct a solid common civic space.
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